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How to research corruption?

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pre face

In June 2016, the first Interdisciplinary Forum “How to research Corruption?” in Amsterdam brought together young academics and practitioners working in the field of (anti-)corruption research.

Focusing on interdisciplinary methodological approaches, more than 50 participants from 22 countries discussed various topics of corruption research. The summaries published in the proceedings reflect the themes of the conference.

Our special thanks go to the co-editors, Laura-Lee Smith and Aiysha Varraich, for their expertise and efforts during the editing process.

Anna K. Schwickerath,
on behalf of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN)

For further information on the network and the conference, please visit: icrnetwork.org

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Using Survey Methods to Research Corruption

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Survey data and methods are perhaps underutilized in the study of the causes and consequences of corruption. This paper is intended to be introductory, and I focus here on survey resources that already exist that are available for secondary analysis. I begin with an introduction to survey methodology and its core feature of generalizability that is also its main advantage. In the second section I provide a (non-exhaustive) list of data sources with example questions which may spark ideas and the webpages where researchers can find out more. Thirdly, I outline some possible applications with reference to the literature on the drivers of corruption.

A brief introduction to surveys

A defining feature of survey methods is that the sample, if done well, is representative of a target population. It follows that statistical inference can be drawn: results from appropriate analysis of the sample can be generalized to the whole population². This defining feature of the survey method is also its advantage, and where it can offer an important complement to other research methods in the study of corruption. Surveys are likely to be an efficient way to estimate average levels of experienced bribery in a given population, in contrast to the use of conviction statistics, for example, which may well be a better measure of the ‘prosecutorial effort’ taken by law enforcement agencies than of the actual incidence of corruption (see Glaeser & Saks (2006) as an example of a study using conviction statistics, and Goel & Nelson (2011) for a critique). In addition, surveys can provide an efficient means to ascertain public perceptions of corruption, and to understand the level and consequences of moral attitudes towards corrupt behaviour.

The target population of a survey is often the population of a particular nation-state, or

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² For an introduction to the method, see the relevant section in Bryman (2015) and for more details on sampling, see Kalton (1983). For a more advanced text covering the history of the development of survey methods and discussion of their epistemological and ontological implications, see Goldthorpe (2016).

sometimes a more specific geographical region. However, surveys can also target businesses rather than individuals, and sometimes more specifically ‘large businesses’ or ‘multi-nationals’. The same principles of representativeness apply. Sampling is a crucial aspect of the survey method, since it determines the level of success in achieving a representative sample. It is worth pointing out that available secondary data from existing surveys are highly variable in this regard including among those listed in Table 1.

One of the downsides of survey research, which has implications even for secondary analysis, is that it is expensive. In cross-national surveys, the costs include the painstaking coordination effort to ensure that questionnaires, question wording, data collection techniques and so forth, are done in a comparable manner. It is cheaper to administer surveys by phone or internet, data collected by these methods may not be as reliable as data collected through face-to-face interviews. However, it is possible that response bias on sensitive topics such as corruption may be lower when the survey is not conducted face-to-face. These questions require consideration by the researcher (see Bowling (2005) for evidence on the mode of data collection and response bias).

Which surveys and where to find data

Corruption is by no means a mainstream topic in national surveys, but there are a number of well-known and widely-used surveys that have occasionally included a module on corruption. In addition, more specialised surveys are available such as Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer. A selection of surveys that are known to contain good measures of corrupt behaviours, perceptions, and attitudes are summarised in Table 1³:

³ In this section, I draw on work I did on a review article which focussed on corruption in the developed world. Some of my examples will reflect this emphasis on corruption in developed countries, and it is likely that there are other excellent regional surveys that I have failed to list here. For the review article, see Heath, Anthony F, Richards, Lindsay and Nan Dirk de Graaf. “Explaining Corruption in the Developed World: The Potential of Sociological Approaches.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 42: 51-79 (2016).

Table 1 Selected surveys with an example question, details of where to access them, and an example study

Survey	Example questions	Where to access	Example study
International Social Survey Programme	<i>In your opinion, about how many politicians/ public officials in [country] are involved in corruption?</i>	See http://www.issp.org/ for general information; Data archived as GESIS http://www.gesis.org/issp/home/	Ariely & Uslander (2014)
Eurobarometer	<i>Over the last 12 months, has anyone in (OUR COUNTRY) asked you, or expected you, to pay a bribe for his or her services? (Police, Customs, Judicial services etc.)</i>	Data available via GESIS website http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/home/	Mungiu-Pippidi (2013)
European Social Survey (2004 only)	<i>How often, if ever, has a public official asked you for a favour/ bribe in return for a service in the last five years?</i>	Data available at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/	Richards & Heath (2016)
World Values Survey	<i>How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption are in this country?</i>	Data available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp	You and Khagram (2005)
International Crime Victimization Study	<i>During the past year, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his service?</i>	Data available at https://dans.knaw.nl/en/search	Nieuwbeerta et al. (2003)
Global Corruption Barometer	<i>What was the approximate amount of money paid overall in bribes by your household in the past 12 months?</i>	http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/gcb_2015_16 Email TI to request access	Weber Abramo (2007)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	<i>Did you give a public official some money, a gift or counter favour on at least one occasion in the 12 months prior to the survey?</i>	Reports available http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/corruption.html	Goel et al. (2012)
Latin American Public Opinion Project	<i>Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last 12 months?</i>	Access or analyse online http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop	Rose and Peiffer (2013)
Latinobarometro	<i>Do you or any relative know any act of corruption in the last 12 months?</i>	Access or analyse online http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp	Ruhl (2011)
New Russia Barometer	<i>In dealing with any of these institutions in the past two year, was it necessary for you or anyone in your household to pay a bribe?</i>	Available at https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/	Rose and Mischler (2010)
Afrobarometer	<i>If you ever paid a bribe...did you report any of the incidents you mentioned to a government official or someone in authority?</i>	Access or analyse online http://www.afrobarometer.org/data	Bailard (2009)
World Business Environment Survey	<i>On average, what per cent of revenues do firms like yours typically pay per annum in unofficial payments to public officials?</i>	Data available at http://go.worldbank.org/RV060VBJU0	Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014)

Notes: This is not an exhaustive list. Other high quality surveys carried out in individual countries also exist. Only one example question per survey is provided. The surveys may cover experiences, perceptions, attitudes, or some combination of these three aspects. See data documentation for further details

Applications of survey methods to the study of corruption

Survey research may offer some opportunities for detailed academic enquiry into the causes and consequences of corruption, and I suggest a few possibilities here.

For teasing out macro-level from micro-level mechanisms

The quantitative literature looking at country-level correlates of corruption has found a range of factors that predict, with some regularity if not universally, the level of corruption in a given country. The average level of education in a country reduces corruption (Uslaner and Rothstein, 2012), for example, as does social trust (Uslaner, 2004). Corruption also tends to be lower in countries with protestant backgrounds (Treisman, 2000). However, these macro-level correlations can leave the mechanisms unclear. What is it about Protestantism that reduces corruption? If the theorised mechanism is about the behaviours resulting from religious doctrine (e.g. Lambsdorff, 2010) then we expect that religious identity at the level of the individual is important. On the other hand, if more cultural explanations (Treisman, 2000) are theorised, then it is Protestantism at the level of the collective that will matter.

Multi-level modelling (see Snijders and Bosker, 2012) with provides a means to tease apart the level at which the effect occurs and the results are illuminating in terms of the mechanisms. For example, education at the individual level seems to increase the probability of engaging in a corrupt exchange, while average education brings down overall corruption of a country. Protestantism at the individual level has no effect on bribery in Europe, suggesting that its effect at the country level does not depend upon morals and values (Richards and Heath, 2016).


For the validation of other indicators

The vast majority of cross-national studies of corruption have used one of the established composite indices, the best known of which is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International (for details see Lambsdorff 2006). Similar indices are produced by the World Bank (Kaufman et al 2004) and the International Country Risk Guide

(ICRG). These have become invaluable campaigning tools and have been used in many of the most-cited quantitative studies of corruption. However, they are also subject to some discussion and debate on what exactly they measure and how well they capture the actual incidence of corrupt exchanges (for discussion and critique, see Philp (2006), Andersson and Heywood (2009), Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014)).

Data from international surveys provides a means to validate, or elucidate, these composite indices. As an example, I show below a comparison of recorded rates of experiences of bribery and for CPI scores for European countries. In many cases we get a good match: for example, among this sample of European countries experience of bribery is most frequent in Ukraine, and Ukraine has a correspondingly low CPI score. However there are also plenty of anomalies: bribery seems far too infrequent in Turkey, for example. Among the countries with very low incidence of bribery, typically in Western and Northern Europe, there is variation in CPI scores. The survey data are as likely as composite indices to contain measurement error, so this is not a plea to ditch the indices. Rather, the survey data may provide an opportunity for greater specificity about the type of corruption in question.

Figure 1 Experienced bribery versus CPI score – Data: Transparency International and European Social Survey 2004



Specificity

A connected point is about specificity. In order to advance academic research into the causes and consequences of corruption, we may need to move past correlations between broad brush measures such as CPI and GDP and develop more specific research questions relating to the type of corruption and its specific causes. It would be surprising if the causes and consequences of street-level bribery and grand corruption are equivalent, for example, or if extortion by a civil servant is equal to bribery in a private company (Heath et al., 2016). The detailed questions available in some surveys may provide opportunity to tackle these kinds of questions empirically. In the Global Corruption Barometer, for example, distinctions can be made between bribes made to, for example, someone working in education, judicial services, and the land registry – it may be that some types of corruption may come about through extortion of the needy, others by control of the rich.

For analysis on the (causal) role of attitudes and norms

Social norms are frequently held as an explanation for levels of corruption in a given country. A simple argument is: where corruption and bribery are simply part of the culture, and if ‘everyone is doing it’, the chances of moral objection are lessened, thus the corrupt behaviours are likely to continue. Many of the surveys mentioned above have detailed questions on moral attitudes as well as on perceptions and behaviours, thereby providing a means to further investigate the role of norms. The Global Corruption Barometer covers different scenarios in the form of vignettes, perhaps allowing more nuanced accounts of norms and culture.

For example, in the 2009 survey respondents were asked “Imagine a... situation for your friend, [a] shopkeeper. While he is applying for the business license, the public official he is dealing with mentions the amount of paperwork and difficulties involved, but he still manages to issue the license. As he hands the license to the shopkeeper, he mentions how thankful many of his clients are for his work. A tipping box is located outside the public official’s office. The shopkeeper puts banknotes into this tipping box, roughly equal in value to five times the price of a good restaurant meal”




Figure 2 Acceptability of the shopkeeper’s behaviour (shown for a random selection of countries in the Global Corruption Barometer) – Data: Global Corruption Barometer 2009

In some countries with next to zero corruption, the moral attitudes are fairly relaxed. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, around half think this behaviour constitutes a bribe and over 30% find the behaviour acceptable. Morocco and Mongolia are countries with higher (and similar) levels of corruption according to the CPI, yet the average acceptability levels are at opposite ends of the scale among this selection of countries. Further detailed analysis of these data may provide an opportunity to gain understanding of the role of norms.

Summary

- > The advantage of survey data and methods is that they bring representativeness, thus allowing inference about a population.
- > Survey measures may be more transparent and specific than the composite indices.
- > These data and methods can allow individual-level and country-level mechanisms to be teased apart. Multi-level modelling appears to be a fitting, yet underutilized, method to understand the drivers of corruption.

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Making Sense of Corruption through interviews

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During the past two decades, research on corruption has steadily been growing. It has gone from being a taboo subject, where it would only be referred to as the C-word, to today's state of the art where it is found across different social science disciplines; whether this is political science, psychology, economics or anthropology (Rothstein and Varraich 2017). With this steady upsurge there has also been constant additions to the toolbox used for researching the subject. It is this toolbox that was the focal point at the workshop during the Interdisciplinary Forum "How to Research Corruption"; where not only the tools were discussed but also shared between the participants in order to further our own research interests. It also allowed us to acquaint ourselves with methods that were unfamiliar to us. The "tools", or rather methods, range from the latest fad of experiments to the less often used qualitative method of interviewing, as well as the mainstream statistical analyses. The aim of this paper is to present interviewing as a "tool" to research corruption. This will be done by answering two questions. First, "why use it?" discussing both the advantages and disadvantages of the method. Second, addressing "what is it?" describing and explaining what interviewing (i.e. the data collection stages) involves. Important aspects of interviewing range from how to present yourself as the interviewer to how to keep a field diary. Finally, this essay will address the limitations of the method as a whole. Since this will be part of conference proceedings, the paper will limit itself to the data collection stages.

Why use it?

First of all, what are interviews? Interviews involve fieldwork, where the researcher gets to have face-to-face interaction with the various stakeholders whom they are interested in. Let us begin with the first question that we ask ourselves when deciding what me-

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thod to use in order to tackle a research question – why use this “tool”? In spite of the flack that qualitative methods receive, interviews carry many advantages (Sundström 2015:11). Firstly, it captures real life. In this age of competing for research funding, the importance of why one’s research matters cannot be reinforced enough. No matter how strong and sturdy a theory we develop in the comfort of our offices, if the theory does not hold, or have “teeth” on the ground, it will fall apart.

Secondly, tying in with the first point, it gives corruption a human face. Statistical analyses with all its advantages, are unable to give us insight into how corruption affects the day-to-day lives of people. Interview data provides the researcher with rich, unique data, situating corruption research into the local context. This helps to reinforce the relevance of corruption research both in academia but also in policy circles.

Thirdly, interviews can help capture the unspoken, i.e. non-verbal cues such as body language and silences, or something as simple as a change of expression – giving insight into how people feel about corruption. These perceptions matter, perception of a system can help make or break the systems in place. If you think the system is broken, you will not use it because you do not expect anything positive from it. For example, drawing from my own experience, my visa expired when carrying out fieldwork and my friends and colleagues advised me not to go directly to the visa office. They suggested that I pay a fee to a middleman who would “get the job done”. The reason they gave this advice is based on their collective perception that the government office was corrupt. Without heeding their advice, I went to the visa office, stood in the queue, paid the visa-extension fee, and within forty minutes my stay was regulated. There is a system in place, but it is handicapped when people refuse to use it because of their perceptions about it being corrupt. Fourthly, interview data can help supplement, explain, validate and reinterpret quantitative data. For example, combining interview data with statistical analysis can be extremely useful. During a study of the sub-national variation of quality of government within the European Union, our research team used regression analysis to establish correlation, and the strength of it between various variables, without the ability to point to causality. However, interviews were used to explain the patterns obtained as well as to untangle the causality between quality of government and corruption in the different sub-national regions. Furthermore, interviews can also be helpful in designing quantitative tools, such as surveys instruments, by helping to hone in on areas that are of interest to the researcher. And finally, interviews appeal to different types of researchers. If you are good at talking

and enjoy socialising, you can put this skill to professional use. It gives you the chance and ability to make your research relevant to society; affords you the opportunity to interact with the society you are researching; and also allows you to see first-hand the effects that corruption has on people's lives and how they tackle it. Finally, it gives you a chance to get out of the office.

What is interviewing?

As aforementioned, interviews involve fieldwork, where the researcher gets to have face-to-face interaction with the various stakeholders whom they are interested in. There are different types of interviews: informal interviewing; unstructured interviewing; semi-structured interviewing and structured interviewing. What sets these types apart is the level of control exerted by the researcher over people's responses (Spradley 1979, Gorden 1975), which effectively will produce different types of data. The type of interviewing and interview control exercised will depend on the type of research question one is addressing as each type serves different purposes. This paper will focus on semi-structured interviewing, the one I have most familiarity with and frequently used over the past six years of doing research on corruption.

What is it good for?

There are two main situations where semi-structured interviews are ideal: either when interviewing experts, or when interviewing a respondent whom you will not interview more than once. The former are respondents that are in the habit of getting interviewed and are used to making efficient use of their time. The latter is a situation where you would be able to garner as much information within the given time from the respondent.

The researcher sets the level of control for semi-structured interviewing by creating and using an interview guide. This is a set of written, predetermined questions that allows the research topic to guide the interview process, thus ensuring that topics of interest are covered. How strictly you follow the guide is up to you as the researcher. In my case, it works as a framework within which to operate. I am able to follow a respondent's lead and delve deeper into an area that I may not have thought about. Keeping it as a framework also allows for a more natural flow of conversation, where professionalism is easily maintained, and the guide can help veer back the respondent to the topic at hand in case a

tangent becomes too divergent. Also, and perhaps most importantly, an interview guide demonstrates that you are fully in control and ultimately it will help produce data that is reliable and comparable.

The interview guide itself is an iterative process. Before embarking on fieldwork, we have to prepare an interview guide that details a list of questions, which best address our overarching research question. Many times, carrying out a pilot interview is essential to see how the questions are being understood by the respondent; as this allows one to gauge which questions are useful and which ones can be dropped. The pilot interview itself will serve as data, and also allow you to revise the guide if necessary. A note of caution: the interviewer should expect the interview guide to evolve continuously. Interviewing is an iterative process, as we interview, we may want to add/remove a question. It is important not to hinder this process but to hone the guide so that the limited time can be put to the best use. My fieldwork in Pakistan helped me realise this very aspect. I wanted to understand the exchange relationship between patrons and clients bound by religious and political affiliation. My initial question was “Does your saint (patron) have any responsibilities towards you? And what are your responsibilities towards your saint (patron)?” This did not elicit much response but a sentence or two, during at least three interviews. But after having spent time in the field for a span of two weeks and mingling with the various congregations, I rephrased my question according to the lingo observed in the field. Now the question I posed was “what are your saint’s duties towards you?” This formulation produced a list of different exchanges and expectations the clients had from their patron. This reinforced the importance of understanding that a data point can be reached through various paths, in this case through different questions. The process is simplified when the researcher is clear about what the question is trying to get at. Therefore, allow the interview guide to evolve, and as an aid to yourself, make notes in the margin of what purpose/end each question is aimed at - this helps clarify to you as a researcher the value of the question, and also whether you are actually gathering new data or merely repeating yourself.

The process

Before elaborating on the process of interviewing, it is important to point out the main key to successful interviewing. The key, as Bernard puts it, is to “learn how to probe effectively – that is, to stimulate a respondent to produce more information, without

injecting yourself so much into the interaction that you only get a reflection of yourself in the data” (Bernard 2006; 217). There are many types of probes; the silent probe (where the interviewer leaves space for the respondent to follow up without interrupting them), the “uh huh” (the one where elaboration is prompted by a mere “mm-hmm” or “uh huh”), long-question (the one where you pose a grand question and leave the reins with the respondent to take over), phased assertion (where you act as if you already know the answer and thus create an environment for the respondent to open up) as well as the echo probe (where the interviewer merely echoes what the respondent has said, allowing the respondent to delve deeper). The skill of probing one learns over time, and it can only be learned by actually interviewing.

Now turning to the process itself, this can be divided into four stages: presentation of self, getting started, finishing up, and applying tools in the field. When presenting oneself, there is one rule of thumb: honesty. The researcher should ensure to inform the respondent what the study is and what the research is about. Explain how and why you are interviewing them, and how you went about selecting them. At times respondents will tell you they probably cannot help you with much. It is your job as a researcher to explain that you are interested in their views and perceptions, and that you are there to learn from them. If the interviewer is honest and open, it will help establish a trust between both parties, allowing the respondents to open up. The physical presentation of oneself should be guided by common sense such as if interviewing at a government office, dress business casual, and if interviewing in a village setting, adapt to the way people present themselves around you. This will help make your respondents comfortable and help them to take you seriously. One difficulty I encountered while presenting myself pertained to my name. My first name, Aiysha, has historical connotations, signalling one to be Sunni Muslim and had the potential to compromise trust between me and potential respondents from other Islamic denominations such as Shia Muslims². I wanted to avoid using my name, but also maintain honesty. So I opted to present myself by my middle name – Kanval. This name does not carry any historical connotations and is still part of my actual identity thus allowing me to maintain honesty.

² After the passing of Prophet Muhammad there was constant tension regarding the next spiritual leader of the Islamic Ummah. When the fourth caliph, Hazrat Ali, was about to take office, he was challenged for the leadership by one of the Muhammad’s widows - Ai’sha. Hazrat Ai’sha went to battle against Hazrat Ali, and only conceded upon defeat. Therefore Shia Muslims, do not name their daughters Ai’sha (Hazleton, 2009).

Rules of thumb for interviewers

Getting started there are a number of issues that the interviewer must remain diligent about; these include the protection of your interviewees identity, the “did I miss anything” question and your tools in the field.

The issue of utmost importance is protecting your informant’s identity, i.e. assuring your respondents that they will have anonymity and confidentiality. The respondents are trusting you with information that at times can be sensitive, therefore, it is imperative that the researcher maintain their ethical duty of doing no harm.

The second rule of thumb is one that is often overlooked, what I call “did I miss anything” question. When wrapping up an interview, it is important to ask the informant if there are any questions they thought you missed to ask. It will surprise you how much information this can trigger and also it allows your informants to talk, instead of you suggesting any answers. The latter is important as it will give you insight into their reality, instead of hearing what you want. Furthermore, in wrapping up the interview, always make sure to offer the respondent to follow-up your research. This firmly indicates the weight given to the respondent in terms of their importance, but also helps to establish a network in the field.

Finally, in the field the main tools of the researcher are a voice recorder (dictaphone) and a field diary. During the interview process, it is important to simultaneously take notes while recording. Scribbling notes can help capture an idea that occurs during the exchange, but also help record non-verbal cues. Practically, it is a backup in case the voice recorder malfunctions or the batteries run out. The field diary on the other hand is a good way to debrief every day, where impressions and memos can be recorded, these will provide a wealth of data once you begin analysing. Over and above this, as a researcher you must obtain permission from your respondent if you can record the interview, whether this is by voice recorder or taking notes. Only then can you proceed to use these tools. Normally interviewees are comfortable in giving their permission to be recorded, however in the case that they are not, you will need to resort to note-taking. There are however ways to overcome the hesitation that respondents may display. One of the simplest ways to overcome such a situation is to dispense control of the interview to the respondent, by this, I mean something as simple as handing the recorder to the interviewee, telling them they can press the “stop” button whenever they feel they do not want to be

on record. This is not only a good way to gain trust, but also puts them in control and puts them at ease. However in the case that this does not work, taking notes and debriefing becomes ever so important.

Warnings and limitations

If there are any warnings I can impart, it is to pace the study. I have the wealth of fantastic methods books to thank for warning me that fieldwork can become tiresome. Asking the same questions day in and day-out can become repetitive and uninspiring when done for months on end. The best preparation is to accept that it can get tiresome, and to schedule a realistic amount of interviews in one day while keeping in mind that one must debrief these on a daily basis. A second caution is the language. I conduct my own interviews, normally in the language spoken by the respondent, whether this is Swedish, English or Urdu. If you are new to the language, it can help to practice it before going out to the field, and familiarise oneself with idioms, inside jokes and layers that one is unaware of. Also, language provides local context, so familiarity with the local situation cannot be over emphasised.

Interviewing, like other “tools” has its limitations, these include; cost, time and limited sample size. Carrying out fieldwork is brilliant, however it is also costly - financially, emotionally and time-wise. It is an investment not every researcher can afford. Getting to the field and staying there has its costs. This can require funding that may not be inherent. The emotional cost can be great if one has a family or is a parent to young children (Bernard 2006) since the time spent in the field can vary from a few weeks to months or even years. Furthermore, unlike statistical analyses, the sample size one can obtain remains limited; interviewing 20-30 people is considered a good amount, whereas a quantitative study will be covering data pertaining to 1000 people or more.

Although the main focus of this presentation and write-up was the process of data collection, it may be useful to briefly point out the data analysis process specifically for interview material. This can be divided into two main phases. The first phase requires the researcher to transcribe all the interview material. Analysis of the interview material begins already at transcription. While typing up the material, one important piece of advice is to keep making notes within the transcripts themselves. The second stage is the overall process of coding. It is the more complicated stage where many forms of analysis can take

place. One type of coding the researcher can choose is thematic, where a scheme is prepared and then coding based on it. Other than that, grounded theory is another method having a resurgence in the qualitative field. Here, the data leads the researcher to find themes using a bottom-up approach. Due to the limited space, I will not detail the entire process here. Instead, I will recommend two invaluable data analysis books that take the reader through a step-by-step coding process based on their own qualitative work, with examples and excerpts of how to go about analysing interview data. The first book is *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Source Book* by Miles and Huberman (1994) and the second one is *Constructing Grounded Theory* by Kathy Charmaz (2006).

Finally, as a parting note let me repeat the excellent advice once forwarded to me - stop reading and start interviewing. It is the only way to learn and improve on this often overlooked (at least of late in political science) tool for researching corruption.

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Experimental Research on Corruption

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Experimental research in social science has blossomed in the last 30 years. Experiments are in general understood as the systematic analysis of causal relationships by using a specific research design. One of the main advantages of using experiments – besides the exploration of causal relationships – is the combination of several methods such as observation or surveys. Social scientists have started to use experimentation to test models in almost every research field of social science such as voting and elections, media studies and political communication, committee and jury decision-making, coordination and cooperation as well as corruption.

The workshop on “Experimental Research on Corruption” during the Interdisciplinary Forum “How to Research Corruption” gave the participants an overview and orientation on how to run experiments in social science in general and on corruption, in particular. The major goal was to show the potential of experimental designs in the field of corruption research. After giving an introduction to the important terms, logic and types of experiments, we discussed certain quality criteria and challenges of conducting experiments with a special focus on lab experiments (Kubbe, 2016).

This method is mainly divided into laboratory, field and survey experiments. The distinction is primarily based on the location, their level of analysis (individual or group), level of control- and validity, and the orientation along norms of economy and psychology (Kubbe 2016). Laboratory experiments are generally seen as the “gold standard.” A laboratory setting allows investigators to control all aspects of the research environment, so that only the independent variables differ, any differences on the dependent variable can be attributed to manipulation, and thus offer support for causal inferences.

Field experiments take place outside the laboratory but allow the experimenter to retain some limited control over the central variables. At their best, field experiments can offer

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a reasonable trade-off between internal and external validity through increased realism without too much loss of control. Finally, survey experiments combine laboratory and field experiment and offer the possibility to use large and representative samples. Individuals can participate independently of their location and there is no necessary need for the physical presence of the experimenter at the expense of less control. In the field of corruption research mainly laboratory experiments are used.

Experimental research on corruption has grown in the last years. Investigating corruption related behavior, like extortion, bribery, or conflicts of interest, through the means of controlled laboratory experiments has become more popular in the last decades. Prior experimental studies have focused on individual determinants of corruption and consider, for example, the influence of an individual's gender, religion, culture, amount of wages, the amount of bribe, level of monitoring and punishment.

Compared to qualitative interview-studies and archival analysis, experiments aim to systematically control and manipulate the environment to gain causal insights into social behavior and the psychology behind it, which is difficult or even impossible to achieve with the aforementioned alternative methods. However, at the same time, a very controlled laboratory environment can be perceived as artificial by the participants, raising the question of external validity: Is the behavior shown by participants during the experiment representative compared to their usual behavior outside the laboratory? This question is of particular importance for researching corruption-related topics, as it entails potentially immoral behavior. We therefore discussed extensively the advantages (causal interpretation, control over confounding variables), and disadvantages (potential lack of external validity) of the experimental method with the workshop participants. Based on this, we discussed how the trade-off of these advantages and disadvantages shift from laboratory to field and survey experiments. For example, while laboratory experiments enable the most control over confounding variables, enabling a clear clean causal interpretation, they sometimes lack external validity, i.e. the behavior of participants during the experiment is not representative of what these participants do outside the lab. Whereas going outside of the laboratory to do experiments in the field can increase external validity, since they take place directly in the environment where corruption-related behavior (like bribery, extortion etc.) might occur naturally. However, the field can introduce confounding variables that are not controllable due to the unstructured environment, which decreases the possibility to make clean causal interpretations of the result. Thus, the lab experiments are promising because even if a person's individual act differ outside the

lab, these experiments are particularly useful to investigate relationships and interaction between people related to corruption.

By looking at published and unpublished experimental studies on the topic of corruption, we showed how experiments can be designed for the lab and field to study corruption. We then discussed how the results of these experimental studies relate to the real-world problem of corruption or unethical behavior. For this, we particularly looked at studies that attempted to link experimental findings to real-world corruption phenomena and had a lively debate on the external validity issue of laboratory results in the field of corruption (Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009; Armantier & Boly, 2008; Gaechter & Schulz, 2016; Potters & Stoop, 2016). After critically reviewing and discussing several studies and their experimental design in the group (i.e. Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2000; 2002; Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009; Di Falco, Magdalou, Masclet, Villeval, & Willinger, 2016; Frank & Schulze, 2000; Lamsdorff & Frank, 2010; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), we worked together on how to plan and conduct own experimental studies. The workshop was very interactive and every participant had the chance to present his or her own ideas. These ideas, for example, involved designing experimental economic games that try to mimic the incentive structure of bribery in the real world, by giving participants the possibility to “bribe” each other (i.e. transferring money) to receive a benefit, which can entail cheating other participants in the experiment. We also discussed possible effects of manipulations like punishment, probability of “getting caught”, or externalities.

In general, we gave an overview on how to implement experiments in the empirical research on corruption, its advantages and disadvantages compared to other common social science methods and we discussed several potential projects on corruption that include experimentation in their designs.

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Quantitative methods in researching corruption: surveys, cross-national studies and measurement issues

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In this paper, we provide a brief overview of the main quantitative methods in researching corruption. We start with an introduction to the problem of measuring corruption and briefly elaborate on citizens and experts surveys as the main sources of data on corruption. We proceed by describing the main statistical methods and techniques used in corruption research. We also discuss the major benefits and pitfalls of quantitative methods in researching corruption and provide suggestions for future research. We conclude with a summary from the workshop on quantitative methods in researching corruption at the 1st Interdisciplinary Forum “How to Research Corruption” in Amsterdam, June 2016, stating the main aims, topics discussed, and contributions from the participants.

Introduction

Corruption, given its secret nature, is a phenomenon that is easy to sense yet hard to capture. It is a constant challenge for researchers, motivating them to develop scientific methods in approaching sensitive issues. According to Seligson (2005), the early research on corruption focused mainly on official police and court records. However, official documents were soon criticized for showing a distorted and selective image of corruption. In order to overcome this ‘distortion’, corruption researchers gathered information from ‘corrupt’ actors, making investigative observations, interviews and public opinion questionnaires. The idea of ‘asking actors themselves’ has its roots in crime-victimization

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approach, promoted by many criminologists (Kesteren 2007). Another alternative measure is to analyze the ‘traces of corruption’, gathering information from mass media or social media content, for example. Some of the methods of gathering information about corruption are favorable to specific methods of corruption analysis. In this workshop, we focused on the benefits and pitfalls of quantitative methods in analyzing corruption, with citizen surveys and expert surveys as the main data sources for the analysis.

Data collection methods: citizen and expert surveys

Citizen surveys reflect people’s hands-on experience with corruption and their perception of the extent of corruption, providing an opportunity to investigate their behavior and opinions. In corruption research, public opinion surveys play a vital role. Despite the noise that can be introduced by the reticence of respondents to answer sensitive questions (Azfar and Murrell 2009), public opinion surveys allow us to study changes in people’s behavior, values and attitudes, causes for people’s propensity to engage in corrupt behavior and its consequences, as well as determinants of their perception of corruption. Surveys have been the major source of information about corruption so far. After the overview of innovative attempts to measure corruption, Nona Karalashvili, Aart Kraay and Peter Murrell (2015) note that “self-reports from surveys will continue to provide the basis for most research on and assessment of corruption in the future” (p.3).

Expert surveys provide the assessment of the extent of corruption within different branches of government on a national or regional level. When expert opinions aggregate to national level data, they lay a basis for comparing corruption levels between higher-level units, such as countries and regions¹, which allows us to pose comparative questions: Why are some countries more corrupt than others? What are the causes and consequences of corruption for the nation state and its population? For example, the corruption data allow us to examine how corruption intervenes in the provision of public goods by the governments, how it slows down economic growth, disrupts trust between individuals and trust in the government.

Data analysis methods: statistical inquiry

The use of statistical methods helps identify patterns in the differences between the units of analysis (such as individuals or countries), while repeated data collection over a

period of time also provide the opportunity to analyze change.

Statistical methods in researching corruption enable us to obtain a broad picture of what the relationship between the factors of interest looks like, identify patterns in analyzing large samples, and make conclusions on the observable patterns. Another advantage is that the results obtained during the analysis are applicable to more cases than what qualitative methods provide the opportunity for, and are generalizable under certain circumstances to cases outside the sample under investigation. This allows us to draw conclusions about the likely outcomes in other cases, which are not included in the original comparison. Including time perspective into the analysis allows for drawing predictions about the future and testing for causal relationships. In general, hypothesis testing provides tools for eliminating rival explanations, which helps build more general theories.

Statistical techniques in corruption research: overview

There are a few types of analyses one can do using statistical methods when investigating corruption. When comparing countries or individuals, OLS regression for continuous outcomes, as well as logistic regression for binary outcomes are common practices. Once a second level of analysis is introduced, it is common to use various multilevel models. A few examples of multilevel or hierarchical data analysis include studying the developments over time across multiple countries, studying changes in behavior over time across many individuals or studying differences between individuals across countries. Time-series cross-sectional as well as panel data can be modelled with:

- > Fixed effects
- > Random effects/mixed multilevel models
- > Pooled OLS with panel corrected standard errors
- > Structural equation models
- > Generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM)
- > Bayesian framework creates a sound alternative to the frequentist perspective and provides more tools for hierarchical modelling.

Using quantitative methods: benefits and pitfalls

Quantitative methods are widely used in the modern-day political and social sciences and help answer a variety of questions. In short, the main benefits of quantitative methods

based on citizen's surveys and expert surveys in corruption research are (a) generalizability of results on population based on a representative random sample design; (b) opportunity and tools to estimate the corruption level; (c) opportunity and tools to create aggregate measures, which allow for comparative analysis; (d) ability to test the expected relationship between corruption and other country characteristics, such as economic development, for example; (e) ability to test the expected relationship between corruption and individual attitudes or behaviors, such as political trust or voting behavior, for example; and (f) ability to detect groups that experience corruption the most or to which corruption is most harmful.

In terms of broader advantages, results of quantitative research can have specific policy implications and provide a basis for developing tools in fighting corruption. However, the quantitative data and methods often rely on a series of assumptions and should be used with caution.

The main pitfalls of the quantitative methods in corruption research are connected with the measurement problems and issues with statistical methods in general. Corruption measures are often subjective and reflect the opinion of a respondent rather than corruption facts and are only a crude proxy for a concept in reality: How well do corruption perception measures reflect actual levels of corruption? As most corruption measures are based on individual perceptions, answers to questionnaires about corruption from experts or individuals are highly sensitive to formulations of the questions. Therefore, one has to be careful with how much negative loading is being transferred in the formulations. Besides, perception of corruption in a country can be biased by factors other than actual corruption level, especially if the concept is too broadly defined in the questionnaire. For these reasons, the measures of corruption are highly likely to miss certain nuances that only in-depth qualitative research can pick up.

The challenges stemming from statistical methods on their own are that it is difficult to model the independent relationship between corruption and other factors, as there are other things that are likely to affect the relationship (such as the level of economic development or regime type) and interfere with the estimates. For this reason, it is difficult to establish causality between the factors and, therefore, problematic to answer the questions that statistical methods are designed to answer in the first place. A related problem is a problem of omitted variable bias. To exemplify omitted variables bias, one can consider the following: corruption is connected with many processes within the soci-

ety, both those that are possible to measure and account for in a regression analysis and those that are intangible. If some of the significant unobserved factors are not modelled explicitly in a regression, their effect will instead be absorbed by the corruption measure, intimately related to these factors. Therefore, the results obtained from a regression on the effect of corruption can be overestimated or biased. To add to the list, the results in cross-country analysis are not generalizable outside the sample under investigation, as it is impossible to draw a random sample of countries.

Research gaps

The quantitative research on corruption could benefit from a more diverse and sound data on corruption. As many existing measurements are suffering from differential item functioning problem, the research is in need of data collection efforts that would model different perceptions of what is meant by corrupt practices in the surveys across different cultures. Latent variable modelling provides tools for dealing with these issues, however, only few efforts have been made to employ latent variable modelling to measuring corruption. Comparative studies would also benefit from alternative data to expert evaluations, such as coded media reports, highlighting corruption scandals, or coded legal documents on corruption regulations, which could be translated into English and be comparable across countries. Another way forward is to combine quantitative methods with qualitative in-depth studies or media discourse analysis effectively into a mixed method approach.

Concluding reflections

The aim of the session Quantitative methods in researching corruption was two-fold. First, the workshop served as a platform for presenting and discussing quantitative analytical techniques used to answer research questions on corruption. We discussed the issues of measurement, including problems with data collection and the use of existing corruption indicators. Second, the workshop involved a critical discussion of the benefits and pitfalls of using quantitative methods in researching corruption. The workshop was divided into three parts: 1) the chairs held short introductory lectures on conducting surveys on corruption, performing cross-national studies, using existing corruption indicators and measurement issues; 2) participants presented their research with the following discussion; and 3) together we brainstormed about strengths and weaknesses

of quantitative methods.

As most of the workshop participants were from a non-quantitative research background, the main focus was on the introduction to quantitative methods, survey methodology, cross-national studies and quantitative text analysis in answering research questions about corruption. The discussion focused on determining benefits and pitfalls of each of the abovementioned quantitative methods in researching corruption, as well as particular substantial questions, such as what are the known determinants of corruption in cross-country research? Specifically, in the discussion, questions were raised on the relationship between corruption, unstable state situation, democracy level, and general social trust. During the workshop we also discussed available data for corruption research on the level of individual perceptions and experiences, characteristics of the survey data, its availability, changing trends in asking questions on corruption, as well as country bias in representing corruption levels.

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- > International Country Risk Guide (Corruption)
<https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg>
- > Quality of Government expert survey
<http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogexpertsurveydata>
- > Varieties of democracy: public sector corruption; executive corruption; legislative corruption, corruption in judiciary <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2>
- > Many indicators are available through Quality of Government dataset:
<http://qog.pol.gu.se/data>

Sources of data for cross-national comparisons (individual level measures):

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Qualitative corruption research methods

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Introduction: the topic of the workshop

First of all, we would like to thank all participants for a very interactive and productive workshop session! This workshop aimed to introduce the participants to qualitative methods and their application to corruption research. Participants worked in groups of three and analysed three articles that applied qualitative methods—interviews, ethnography, focus groups—to research different types of corruption in different countries. The idea was not to discuss abstractly about qualitative versus quantitative research, but to look at actual pieces of evidence and their interpretation. Therefore, the papers were discussed focusing on the specific advantages and limits of each chosen technique.

The first goal was to show the contribution of qualitative methods in corruption research, by showing how different types of data can give access to dimensions of corruption neglected or overlooked by other methods. The second goal was to debunk the myth that certain research topics demand specific methods, thus helping participants choose the most suitable method for their own research, or to make the most out of a given method.

State of research

At first, participants indicated their experience with qualitative and quantitative research methods, to facilitate a common understanding of the participants' backgrounds. Importantly, several participants did not fit this quali-quant box, as they came from a legal background. Others had backgrounds in discourse analysis or document analysis. These turned out to be enriching contributions for the workshop. In general, few participants had carried out qualitative research themselves, but some were planning to do so in the near future. We then had a discussion on the underlying philosophy of science (see figure 1).

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Although there is not always a clear line separating the different approaches, qualitative research is situated more on the side of subjectivism:

Subjectivism / interpretivism / constructivism	Objectivism or positivism
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Credibility > Transferability > Dependability > Confirmability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Internal validity > External validity > Reliability > Objectivity

Figure 1 Philosophy of science – Data: own elaboration based on Bryman (2012)

Let us take a closer look at these criteria for evaluating qualitative research and suggest some tips on how to make use of them (Bryman 2012):

- > **Credibility:** trustworthiness of the findings. The research is conducted according to the canons of good practices, and others have the chance to verify the data and the analysis made. Respondents validation and triangulation are great tools to insure credibility. When possible, always give priority to the use of already validated instruments shown in published research (interview guides, participants selections strategies, etc).

- > **Transferability:** “thick description” of the case studied enabling others to evaluate possible transference of findings to different contexts.
Use appendices or online only resources (for journals). If you must ensure respondents anonymity, you can use fictitious names, as long as you provide enough contextual information.

- > **Dependability:** also known as “auditability”, concerns the keeping of complete records of every step of the research in an accessible manner.
This is something to keep in mind as the first step of the research. If you keep them all, you should let your advisors and journal’s editors know that they are available.

- > **Confirmability:** ensuring transparency in subjective research means making clear that the findings are not influenced by personal values or theoretical inclinations.
Clear distinction between data and analysis.

This distinction should be enough so the reader can make her own analysis of the “pure“ data without confusing it with your analysis. Boxes can be useful.

In a next step, we gave an overview of key qualitative research methods:

<p>> Ethnography:</p> <p>“thick description” (Geertz, cf. Bryman 2012, 292) of the group/phenomena studied</p> <p>Can make use of different techniques</p> <p>Preferred technique for research with open questions and unstructured interviews</p> <p>“these methods [...] involve the expertise of the experienced and isolated researcher working on a single site.” (Blundo et al. 2006, 13)</p> <p>Participant observation: “does not lend itself well to the participant observation method, given that it involves behaviours that actors tend to keep secret and entails risks associated with the disclosure of ‘sensitive’ information” (Blundo et al. 2006, 18)</p>
<p>> Semi-structured interviews:</p> <p>Recording: sometimes useful, sometimes disturbing</p> <p>Analysis: transcription, coding, identifying key-words, categorising types of answers</p> <p>Snowballing (selection of new participants according to information gathered in prior interviews)</p> <p>Data saturation</p> <p>Sequential interviewing</p>
<p>> Focus groups:</p> <p>An interview with several people is not necessarily a focus group</p> <p>Focus on interactions (observer and moderator; who is dominant? etc.)</p> <p>Non-verbal manifestations (body-language, silence)</p> <p>Key role of moderator</p> <p>Homogenous or heterogeneous groups (and number)</p>

Figure 2 Qualitative research methods (see especially Blundo et al. 2006; Bryman 2012; Russel Bernard 2006)

This overview generated three key questions regarding qualitative research methods:

Question 1: How do you handle the tension between full disclosure of sources and anonymity of research participants?

Do you need to protect your research participants? The well-being of your respondents might be at stake here, so consider this question before starting fieldwork. Although anonymity can be the “easy answer”, consider the need to justify it to your readers and evaluators.

Although fictitious names are popular, they might not be enough. Consider the amount of contextual information you will need to provide in order to assure “transferability” to your research (see above). It can be useful to take the anonymity to a broader scale in order to provide details of the case studied.

If you promised anonymity, you will need to do the best possible to protect them. Interviews with representatives of institutions do not need to be anonymised if these respondents speak in the name of the institution. However, these individuals may decide to go off the record. You can then decide to anonymise the entire case, and risk losing some credibility, or to insert the secret information without identifying where it came from.

To protect yourself and give more credibility to your research, you can ask respondents to sign participation forms. If you decide not to, make sure you can justify your choice.

Question 2: How does the researcher influence the research process?

Invariably, researchers influence the research process, in both quantitative and qualitative research. Building a research design, choosing concepts, designing questions etc. In qualitative research, the particularity is the constant and direct interaction between researcher and the people who are talked to. Researcher positionality is a term to describe this matter. For instance, one ought to be aware of certain structural features (a white, upper-class man is perceived differently than a black upper-class woman for instance). Such positions are not deterministic of the research outcome and on the interaction with research subjects. More broadly, every researcher is influenced by “experience, education, personnel background, and so on,” (Yanow 2009, 278). Awareness of these aspects is an important characteristic of good qualitative research, as they might influence the way a researcher understands the stories and narratives of interview partners.

Apart from these intersectional categories, qualitative researchers are constantly faced with interpretations and representations of the world, and do not seek to portray it objectively. This process can be best understood as double hermeneutics: “The first hermeneutic belongs to those we are studying—the so-called actors in the situation: their interpretations of their firsthand experiences. This is the initial interpretive moment. The second hermeneutic is the researcher’s: the interpretations we make of situational actors’ interpretations as we participate with them, talk with them, interact with and observe them, and read (literally or figuratively) their documents and other research-relevant artifacts” (Yanow 2009, 278).

Question 3: How do you know you are done with your data collection?

Qualitative research allows two approaches: a complete research design from the beginning, or an open-end research, where you start your fieldwork with some key people you want to talk to and build up from there (referred to as snowball sampling). In both cases, you should consider a respondent-driven sampling, extending or adapting your sample. Eventually, you will recognize that new interviews do not bring up any more relevant information — your data will become saturated (Russell Bernard 2006). But research is also limited by time and resources, and sometimes you might have to stop although you don’t have the feeling to have fully achieved everything. This should then be reflected upon throughout your writing. Plan your research well in order to build the best (and not necessarily the largest) sample from the beginning.

Topics discussed during workshop

Anthropologists researching corruption explain that they do not see research on corruption as a particular sub-discipline, but “as a stepping stone leading to other phenomena” (Blundo et al. 2006, 4). Likewise, Anders points out that “often corruption is just one, often minor, aspect of civil servants’ social lives.” (Anders 2002, 2). The texts that were analysed in the group-work tried to explore these issues.

Group work

Three excerpts of relevant empirical analyses were distributed and participants analysed them in groups of three. Participants received some guiding questions to go through the texts and, moreover, all groups received five general questions that they discussed in their subsequent

presentations:

1. Brief presentation of the paper (research questions, methods, actors and informants, type of evidence collected)
2. What have we learned from the paper (that we didn't know before)?
3. How do the insights help you in your understanding of corruption?
4. Which are the advantages and limits of the chosen method for the specific research?
5. Which other methods could be used instead—or in complement— and which kind of data would be accessible then?

Addressing a key issue in corruption research, Blundo explains that empirical evidence suggests not a deficit of accountability, but rather an excess thereof. In this particular study he identifies four types of accountability: representational, vicinal, patron-client and peer accountability. Here, suffice to exemplify one of these types with the definition he provides: Vicinal accountability “concerns every individual as a social actor embedded in multiple networks of close belonging. It implicitly obliges classmates, neighbors, members of the same ethnic group, brotherhood or political party to mutually help each other, or risk moral punishment.” (Blundo 2015, 148). One piece of empirical evidence illustrates this issue: Blundo cites an assistant regional director of environment: “When you're in your home territory, there are interferences. When a brigade catches a delinquent and it's someone you know, well, there is always this interference. The problem will be resolved with your help, although the guy has committed an offence. You, you're between the hammer and the anvil, that's the problem!” (Blundo 2015, 149).

Blundo's approach makes clear that a sole focus on 'formal' accountability mechanisms—as is strongly advocated by proponents of good governance and anti-corruption discourses—does not recognize actual mechanisms and how they operate in reality. Such shortcomings cannot lead to sustainable solutions and will further lead to a misunderstanding of the term corruption.

Article 2: Rodrigo Zarazaga, 2014

Beyond describing all the roles brokers perform for their parties, this article presents a theoretical explanation for why brokers multitask. Brokers have the neighborhood knowledge required to perform political activities at the local level that no one else can do, or do so efficiently. This study shows that performing non-clientelistic roles prepare brokers better to execute clientelistic strategies. The research is based on in-depth interviews with 120 brokers and participant observation. The brokers were selected through the snowball technique. Prolonged firsthand

observation in the field allowed the author to capture the clientelistic machine at work. One could assume that governing, campaigning, and supervising elections each requires different sets of skills, and therefore, politicians would resort to different brokers depending on the task. However, brokers' actions show that this is not the case; politicians do not diversify roles, and brokers multitask. The article doesn't show how voters actually reacted, focusing solely on brokers. Some departing questions were left with no answer due to the approach (for example, why voters abide by the clientelistic deal?).

Workshop participants considered a survey with voters as a complementary research technique in order to obtain more holistic results. They also discussed what we could learn through a focus on the patrons (competitive particularism).

Article 3: Anders, 2002

Anders does not consider corruption as deviant behavior but "rather embedded in a society where the modern division between the public office and the private is not the exclusive manner of defining a civil servant's place in social space" and starts his analysis from the conviction that "State law is only one of the multiple sets of rules operating within the civil service of Malawi" (Anders 2002, 3). He offers an analysis based on the vernacular that denotes "any kind of illegal, dubious or shady deal or practice connected to the place of work or the office in the formal sector that serve the enrichment of the employee." (Anders 2002, 5f) "Although people do not approve of it they will often talk about it in a rather ironic fashion acknowledging it as an intrinsic aspect of formal employment" (ibid). He thereby shows that "[t]he general rejection of 'Corruption' does not imply a clear and unequivocal rejection of practices considered to be corrupt among average Malawians" (ibid). This insight is important for researchers who try to interpret the respondents' answers regarding corruption.

Future research

We encourage researchers to pursue the use of qualitative research methods to study phenomena associated with corruption and not be afraid to explore topics that are traditionally investigated with quantitative research with qualitative methods. Linking single corrupt practices to the broader "corruption complex" (Olivier de Sardan 1999) is a necessary step to avoid misrepresenting people's behavior and neglecting underlying power structures. Such an endeavor ought to be attentive not to confuse the "corruption complex" with a culturalist understanding of typical (e.g. "African") behavior (Blundo et al., 2006). Instead, embedding research on cor-

ruption in broader issues of public bureaucracies and drawing on e.g. organizational research and research about 'the state' has shown to be an important topic which still requires attention and further exploration (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Blundo et al., 2006). Finally, anthropological research has increasingly used narratives and discourses of corruption in people's everyday life as an entry point to explore people's understanding of bureaucracies and the state (Shore and Haller, 2005).

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Researching endemic corruption at the country level: The case of Ukraine

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Introduction

The aim of our workshop was to discuss different approaches on how to research corruption at the macro-level. The case of Ukraine is of special interest for two reasons. First, Ukraine represents a country where corruption is endemic and present in all spheres of life. Secondly, extensive anti-corruption reforms were introduced in 2014-15, without an accurate analysis of their long-term impact, which makes further research important. Practically, the workshop results will be used for designing future research projects at the newly founded Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre in Ukraine (ACREC)³.

In the workshop researchers from Ukraine, Germany, USA, Czech Republic, UK, Iran, Sweden, Poland, and Guatemala participated.

One of the main ideas of the workshop was to analytically dissect the issue of corruption at the macro-level into several concrete research subfields. Thus, we introduced the following research sub-fields: political/grand corruption, systemic every-day corruption, and anti-corruption.

For research of political/grand corruption, we identified the system of corruption appro-

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³ In addition to the Master Program in anti-corruption, the aim of the ACREC is to develop the research expertise on the high, internationally accepted scientific level. The research of the ACREC will address both, the study of corruption and anti-corruption.

ach as especially useful, for it allows studying structures and their functions, processes and dynamics, as well as placing actors in an institutional context, and analysing the constellation of actors and their interaction.

For research of systemic every-day corruption, the participants of the workshop pointed out the necessity to identify the core (or source) of corruption in each sphere of life: education, health care etc. This approach includes the identification of losers and winners of corruption, as well as the elaboration of priority measures to address the core of corruption problem, the source of corruption incentives. Some participants stressed the process approach instead of the project approach as necessary to analyse corruption.

For research of anti-corruption, workshop participants also stressed the importance of elaborating objective success indicators of anti-corruption reforms. As an initial step, a systemic analysis of the state of the art is crucial in order to study the evolution and impact of the ongoing anti-corruption reforms. During the workshop, we discussed two major methodological challenges in the assessment of new anti-corruption institutions. First, the stereotypes and perceptions of corrupt political institutions may distort the results of surveys on new anti-corruption institutions in the population. Second, biased experts may distort the results of the interviews, conducted in the new anti-corruption institutions. Interviewing experts is a common method in Ukraine for the assessment of anti-corruption reforms. The personnel of the new anti-corruption institutions is often represented in such assessment studies as “experts”. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that they are not impartial in the assessment of their own job. The workshop participants suggested using mixed methods in order to overcome potential biases in research. Moreover, using lab experiments and economic games could be useful to double check the results, because experiments are a good source to point out the causal flow of corrupt behavior. Besides, it is advisable to use indirect indicators for the assessment of anti-corruption reforms, such as quality of life or trust in society. The reason is that direct anti-corruption measurements based on the number of investigated corruption cases, for instance, do not allow a distinction between cosmetic anti-corruption measures and real impact of anti-corruption policy.

An interesting discussion occurred around the political will to tackle corruption. While many experts appeal to the missing political will as the core problem for failed anti-corruption reforms, Persson and Sjösted suggest rethinking the concept of political will as “something being conditioned by underlying social contracts, rather than something emanating from a particular leader’s inherent qualities and wishes” (Persson/Sjösted, 2012:626)

In summary, the workshop was helpful to structure corruption research at the macro-level and to identify important research gaps. The analytical structure suggested here can be helpful not only for the case of Ukraine, but also for the contextualization of corruption research at the country level worldwide. We include the results of the discussion into the structure of this summary. In addition, the summary contains some ideas initiated by the discussion with participants of the workshop.

The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we give an overview of different research fields, directly related to corruption as an “umbrella”-concept (Varraich, 2014). These will be further outlined in the following sub-chapters:

1. Political corruption, including research of actors involved, their constellation, institutional structures, functions and decision making processes;
2. Systemic every-day corruption, including corruption research in different fields of society, such as economic, education, healthcare etc.;
3. Anti-corruption, including research of both, top-down (government and intergovernmental organisations) and bottom-up (civil society, NGOs) anti-corruption initiatives.

Second, for each subsection we provide a brief overview of the state of the art and identify research gaps that should be addressed in future studies. One important source of information to study corruption at the country level, are cases investigated by prominent (investigative) journalists and active anti-corruption NGOs. Apart from scholarship by internationally renowned researchers such as Anders Åslund (2014), Andrew Wilson (2016), Henry E. Hale (2015), Taras Kuzio (2015) and Oliver Bullough (2014), the findings from the Razumkov Centre’s⁴ study on political corruption (2009), serve as a good foundation for the study of political corruption in Ukraine.

Political Corruption

As corruption is pervasive in Ukraine, for analytical purposes it is reasonable to differentiate between the system of political/grand corruption and systemic, every-day corruption in different spheres of society (Bussell 2015; Andvig and Fjeldstad 2001).

In the context of Ukraine, the concept of the system of corruption is appropriate to analyse political corruption (Huss 2016). The term system has been used in post-Soviet countries to

⁴ Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov is one of the leading think tanks in Eastern Europe and Ukraine

define a specific type of governance structure, including formal and informal institutions, as well as structures and processes that influence participants' behavior (Shevtsova 2005, 16; Karklins 2005, 13). Although referring to this term, the way, how the system of corruption operates in Ukraine was described in detail only recently (Huss 2016).

The system of corruption concept has to be differentiated from the notion of systemic corruption: while the concept of systemic corruption aims at describing permanently repeating corrupt practices and processes that follow a certain pattern, independently of the scale of petty or grand corruption, the concept of the system of corruption focuses on structures and governing forms of formal and informal institutions by means of corruption and aims to analyse the role of grand political corruption in all its forms for the political system.

Importantly, the system approach allows a corruption analysis not only on the output (laws and regulations) and outcome (policy implementation) side of the system, but also on the input (influence from the “environment”) side of the system. On the input side in Ukraine, apart from society, oligarchs – owners of big business enterprises – play a crucial role in shaping the political system (Pleines 2009). For oligarchs, politics is business: they invest considerable amounts of private funds into politics for personal gain. Oligarchs influence politics in three major ways: first they own political parties⁵, representing their particular interests. Second, they personally hold key political offices, and finally they influence politics through mass media companies through ownership. This business logic – investing in politics with the aim to make profits - defines their political behavior, which illuminates the structural preconditions for large-scale corruption in Ukraine.

Thus, for the analysis of endemic corruption at the country level, the following should be addressed: the structure, the institutions (formal and informal) and their functions, as well as the actors and their behavior.

Studying oligarchs as interest groups

Political scientists study oligarchs from different perspectives: The prevailing question is, what is the role of oligarchs in the political system of Ukraine (Pleines 2009) and how do they influence regime trajectories (Melnykovska 2014). Another prominent research question is how do oligarchs adapt to the revolutionary changes and formal de-oligarchisation (Halling and Stewart 2016) and how do they maintain their influence (Wilson 2016). Some studies focus concretely on the reciprocal relationship between oligarchs and the President of Ukraine

⁵ Owning political parties means in this context that oligarchs provide the main source of funding for political parties. They take decisions about key political positions in the party or become the leader of political party themselves.

(Melnykovska 2015).

An interesting development was noticed after the Maidan revolution, which could become the subject of new research: oligarchs consider the penetration of civil society activities as a new strategy of maintaining influence (Leshchenko 2015). Against the background of the increasing role of civil society in Ukrainian politics, it is crucial to study the role of oligarchs. Are these wolves in sheep's clothing, or do they fulfill an important function as intermediaries between society and the state?

Studying corruption in political parties and elections

At the input side of the system, the role of political parties and political finance as well as corruption during elections is crucial (Huss 2016). Classical questions in this field of study are what types of political systems, finance, and election system increases or reduces corruption risks (Smilov 2007; Protsyk and Walecki 2007)? The Razumkov Centre's study of political parties in Ukraine, focuses on their susceptibility to corruption, and shows the historical development of political parties and details reasons for their increasing dependence on oligarchic funding (Razumkov Centre 2010).

Under conditions of major anti-corruption reforms after the Maidan revolution, big hopes for de-oligarchisation resulted from the new regulation to public finance for political parties. Thus, further research is needed, to find out under what conditions this reform can be successful. What are the indicators of success? And how to monitor this reform? Another issue worth investigating is a potential reform of the electoral system that currently bears unlimited corruption risks: for instance, regulation on funding of electoral campaigns and political advertisements contains serious gaps, although these are the main items of expenditure for political parties and individual candidates.

Studying political elites and the decision-making process

On the one hand, the analysis of political elites and informal constellations of power between political actors delivers findings about political influence beyond democratic elections. There are interesting sociological studies of political elites, their informal networks, and structures (Kostiuchenko 2011; Kostiuchenko 2012), as well as informal patron-client relations in politics (Fisun 2015). On the other hand, the analysis of the decision-making processes, communication of interests, and lobby work, shows that not only monetary corruption (bribes), but also political corruption in the form of clientelism and patronage play a crucial role in the political

system. The Razumkov Centre's study "Political Corruption in Ukraine: Actors, Manifestations, Problems of Countering" gives a detailed overview of the corruption risks in the legislation process (Razumkov Centre 2009).

As a possible research gap, it would be interesting to study the "exceptions" - i.e. those few individual members of Parliament, who proved to be independent from oligarchic influence. Another interesting phenomenon to study in the Ukrainian Parliament is the faction of Euro-optimists, who used to be activists of civil society and joined Parliament after the Maidan protest. The Euro-optimists often promote the parliamentary legislation of critical laws, developed by civil society organizations. Another issue is the relation between formal and informal institutions in the country and the question of how they are interrelated? Henry Hale (2015, 16) argues that in hybrid regimes like Ukraine, the constitution is more likely to shape informal expectations by pointing out the actors with ultimate power, than to be followed as a legal document. This assumption should be studied further. As a conceptual basis for such a study, one can use the model of interaction of formal and informal institutions, developed by Helmke and Levitsky (2004).

Studying corruption on the outcome side

The output side of the political system refers to the state of policy implementation through the bureaucracy. At the output side, major corruption risks occur when oligarchs and other actors of the business sector who invested into political parties and elections use politics to make a profit. Åslund (2014) and Bullough (2014) study corrupt schemes that make large scale private enrichment possible at the highest political level. To study corruption on the outcome side, it is useful to focus on sectorial policies, such as tax and custom services, public procurement policies, or ownership policies and state subsidies in the field of natural resources. For further research, the structural approach and detailed study of different corrupt networks and schemes are necessary (della Porta and Vannucci 2012). Another aspect of research should address the international legal context of corruption in the big sectorial policies: the issue of money laundering regulations, and the use of foreign tax havens that enables business owners to hide their identity.

Systemic every-day corruption in Ukraine

In Ukraine, the existence of grand/political corruption goes hand in hand with the widespread every-day corruption (mostly petty) at all levels and spheres of society, where ordinary citizens

are involved. With regards to corruption in Ukraine and a few other post-communist countries, Miller et al. (Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina 2001) coined the term 'culture of corruption' to describe the regional particularities of post-Soviet corruption, including the legacy of communist-regime corruption. Based on a study of petty corruption in Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, Miller pointed to the 'corruptibility' of citizens in the post-communist countries (Miller 2006). Corruptibility means that although the clear majority of citizens and officials condemn the use of presents and bribes, a plurality of citizens are ready to bribe if asked. However, in her study "The System Made Me Do It", Karklins (2005) documents the tendency of citizens to blame 'the system' for the extent of such 'corruptibility' in their countries. Accordingly, Monika Bauhr introduces a conceptual differentiation between "need corruption" - when corruption is needed to gain access to "fair" treatment as opposite to "greed corruption" - special illicit advantages (Bauhr 2016).

Corruption and its consequences in society have been studied in the following fields:

Economy

Closely related to corruption in the economy is the so-called shadow economy that is extremely widespread in Ukraine. Very few authors in Ukraine are working on the methodology of an evaluation and definition of the shadow economy (Shumska and Nezhyvenko 2013). More research in this field is needed. Another approach to study corruption among firms are surveys to measure the perception of corruption in the business sector, indicating regional differences among firms (Denisova-Schmidt and Huber 2014). Additional research on compliance and transparent lobby work among firms is needed.

Education

Researching corruption in higher education is a relatively widespread topic. Studies are available about a reform of the educational sector in Ukraine and the success of independent tests as a tool to reduce corruption during the application phase to universities (Klein 2014). The current trend in this field goes toward assessment of the broader context, such as a corporate culture of universities, and its influence on corruption (Zaloznaya 2012). However, there is a lack of experimental methods. As such, the use of experimental methods would be of advantage for the further studies (e.g. Kubbe 2016; Köbis et al. 2015).

Healthcare

Research of corruption in the Ukrainian healthcare system is rather rare. However, several studies are dedicated to the issue, such as causes of corruption in the health care system and the development of administrative mechanisms against corruption in health care by the state (e.g. Popchenko 2008, Popchenko 2010), and the interdependency of low quality medical service and corruption (e.g. Radysh and Bilynska 2013).

Furthermore, the Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC) conducted a highly significant investigation of corruption in public procurement of medicine. The investigation unveiled multiple corrupt schemes, like kickbacks and embezzlement of large amounts of money during public procurement of drugs for treating AIDS, cancer, tuberculosis and hepatitis⁶. As a result of the investigation a new law on “reforming public procurement in the healthcare sector” was advocated by the AntAC and adopted by Parliament. This law transferred the responsibility for the procurement of drugs in Ukraine to international non-profit organizations, such as UNICEF and UNDP, preserving around 40% of the state budget for drugs from fraud.

The focus of further research in this field should be on the following issues:

1. Detection and identification of the most common corruption schemes in the health care system;
2. Monitoring of the new public procurement procedures in the health care sector;
3. Identifying the connection between low quality health care system and systemic corruption at medical schools (Universities);
4. Examining interdependencies of health care insurance (currently not obligatory in Ukraine) and the level of corruption

Anti-Corruption policies

The revolutionary momentum, combined with strong pressure from international organizations (e.g. anti-corruption reforms are a precondition for IMF loans to Ukraine), resulted in the adoption of the new anti-corruption reform package by the Ukrainian parliament on 14 October 2014⁷. However, this is not the first time such measures have been introduced in Ukraine: new

⁶ Anti-Corruption Action Centre and All-Ukrainian Network PLWH (2013) “Who makes money on epidemics of HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis in Ukraine”, Kyiv. Available online under: http://network.org.ua/upload/novosti/zvit_Who%20makes%20money_eng.pdf. Also see article Oliver Bullough (2015).

⁷ Law ‘On the Fundamentals of Anti-corruption Policy in Ukraine (Anti-corruption Strategy) To Be Effective within 2014-2017’.

anti-corruption laws have been adopted during every presidency since independence in 1991—to no avail. Besides, latest studies show that wholesale reforms being imported from international organisations may never help, unless these are tweaked and adjusted to local conditions (e.g. Easterly 2007). Researchers therefore should ask whether these latest reforms will fare any better, in other words what challenges are likely to encounter and what prospect they have of success?

Anti-corruption reforms can be analytically divided into top-down anti-corruption policies and bottom-up anti-corruption activities.

Top-down anti-corruption policies

Detailed analysis of the anti-corruption reform package has been extensively presented in several independent reports, conducted, in particular, by Transparency International Ukraine (Kovryzhenko and Chebanenko 2015), the International Renaissance foundation (Voloshyna 2015) as well as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (ACN OECD 2015). According to “The Alternative Report on the Evaluation of State Anti-Corruption Policy Efficiency” (Voloshyna 2015, 3), this legislation completely regulates key sectors of anti-corruption activities in Ukraine and creates enough preconditions to develop effective state mechanisms that will help prevent and tackle corruption. The legislation envisages the creation of two new specialized anti-corruption bodies - the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). Additionally, a special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Office (SAPO) was created.

According to legal expert Prof Khavroniuk (2014), who focuses on anti-corruption, it is the first time the law clearly defines different types of corruption and means of its prevention accordingly. Corruption is criminalized in accordance with international norms and standards; different types of punishment corresponding to the corruption types are defined. This implies that the legislation aims to curb corruption as a systemic issue, which is possible only by complexity measures. In other words, corruption should be tackled indirectly, for example including its prevention through education. Besides, the strategy indicates performance indicators and an annual public report on its implementation, which is an important improvement in comparison to former strategies.

As described above, reforms bear challenges and new questions for further research. First, indicators and tools for the assessment and evaluation of the special anti-corruption institu-

tions are needed. Second, in-depth studies of these new anti-corruption institutions – NABU, NAPC, SAPO - are required, to analyze shortcomings and success stories in the work and interaction of these institutions. Third, the issue of political will needs re-thinking as a complex interdependence of diverse factors that influence leading politicians in their decision making (Persson and Sjöstedt 2012).

Importantly, Ukraine has achieved some progress in creating legal provisions for whistleblower protection. Despite the absence of a separate law on whistleblower protection, the right of people to adequate protection is anchored in the law (e.g., Art. 11 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Access to Public Information’, also Art. 53 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corruption’). The focus of further research in this field should be on the following issues:

1. examining the legal framework relevant to whistleblower protection for classified disclosures and the intelligence community;
2. assessing strengths and weaknesses of current legislation;. the focus should be on detecting strengths and weaknesses of the internal and external reporting mechanisms and remedies for whistleblowers, and should include academic assessment.
3. indicating the most appropriate mechanisms for securing whistle-blower protection for officials who blow the whistle about abuses of power, violations of law or other wrongdoing;
4. studying public opinion regarding whistleblowers in Ukraine.

Bottom-up anti-corruption activities

Civil society organisations (CSO) play an important role in advocating anti-corruption reforms in the country and monitoring of the adopted legislation and its practical implementation (Korvyzhenko and Chebanenko 2015). In line with the recent assessment of the National Integrity System (NIS) pillars, civil society, after anti-corruption agencies, became the strongest pillar of the NIS in 2015 (ibid). The relation between government and civil society changed radically after the Maidan events.

All major anti-corruption CSOs participate in the Reanimation Package of Reforms - initiative that advocates reforms in various sectors of governance. This civic coalition developed its own agenda of priority reform measures, including anti-corruption, and actively promoted it. As a 2015 OECD report states, the new administration often follows the lead of civil society and due to significant public pressure and high expectation of reforms, takes on board many of the reform measures developed by NGOs. For the first time, civil society experts were either

taking the lead or directly participating in the development of anti-corruption policy.

One of the best practice examples for bottom-up anti-corruption initiatives is the development of ProZorro, the online platform for public procurement. A small group of young activists developed ProZorro on a voluntary basis, shortly after the Parliament introduced legislation on transparency in public procurement in 2014. Very early the activists received support from Georgian experts as well as an EU project on harmonization of the public procurement system in Ukraine. Thus, they created an e-auction system ProZorro that aims at transparent and effective public spending and corruption preventing through monitoring and competition among suppliers (Shatkovskyi and Fiveash 2015). Today, it is the most dynamic and popular initiative for public procurement worldwide⁸. Meanwhile, ProZorro is mandatory for all ministries and other central executive bodies.

Currently, research trends in the bottom-up assessment of anti-corruption are dedicated to the role of civil society in anti-corruption policies and that of Western actors in the development and implementation of anti-corruption strategies. Similarly, as in top-down cases, research-based assessment and effectiveness studies are needed to show the advancement of anti-corruption policy. Another interesting topic for further research is the interplay of different organizations, interaction and cooperation of civil society and the state in anti-corruption fields. Additionally, the role, motives and instruments of external partners – state governments and intergovernmental organizations – in the anti-corruption reforms of Ukraine should be investigated.

⁸ In May 2016, ProZorro received the international Procurement Leader Award for creating and implementing an electronic system with a unique architecture. See "ProZorro—the Best System in the World in the Sphere of Public Procurement," Transparency International Ukraine, May 19, 2016, <http://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/monitoryng-deklaraciy/media/6039.htm>

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How to Research Anti-Corruption

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Introduction into the topic of the workshop

Research of anti-corruption initiatives is inherently linked to the aims of successful anti-corruption strategies and policies. The core of any anti-corruption reform should be the nature of the complex interactions between the initiator of the corrupt act and the person directly or indirectly engaged. Additionally, research should examine (official as well as non-governmental) anti-corruption reforms regarding their effect on and cost for society.

This summary follows the structure of the workshop “How to Research Anti-Corruption” and commences with a short overview of the most recent advances in this area of research. It continues with the discussion of the main topics covered in the workshop such as anti-corruption phases and concludes with discussing examples of anti-corruption research from Bulgaria and Romania as well as a cross-country anti-corruption agency index.

The state of research in this area, the topics most discussed during the workshop, and possible research gaps

The first part of the presentation and the workshop was dedicated to the definition of corruption and the relation to good governance. The presentations were structured primarily around a pragmatic- and practical-based approach towards the topic in contrast to a normative examination. The definition of corruption was formulated as a structural problem through the prism of legal, moral, societal and economic aspects. Traditional notions of corruption such as the interaction between the government/administration and the market economy/private sector were briefly covered. The accepted types of corruption

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such as petty, grand and political corruption were also discussed. For example, a traditional definition of corruption is captured in the following lines as ‘behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains.’ (Nye 1967:416) A similar tenet is found in a more contemporary approach to what corruption may entail: “behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status.” (Khan 1996:12)

The participants in the workshop, a mixture of master-level and doctoral students and researchers as well as practitioners in the field of anti-corruption, actively engaged in the opening discussion of forms of corruption such as bribery, fraud, favoritism and nepotism. Specifically, the participants contributed in a valuable and knowledgeable manner to the section on key factors for research, which included Klitgaard’s formulation of corruption as being the sum of monopoly power and discretion by officials minus accountability.

Anti-corruption phases and approaches

Turning to anti-corruption research, first a brief review of traditional anti-corruption approaches and conceptions was provided. Common for these approaches is the understanding of corruption as a principal agent problem. Solutions thus focus on creating integrity agents through measures such as anti-corruption institution building, capacity building, improving legislation or public finance management and the subscription to international standards in agreements or conventions. These strategies are mainly based on experiences of Western democracies and anti-corruption success cases such as Hong Kong or Singapore (cf. Beyerle 2014).

The workshop continued with a lively discussion on the traditional anti-corruption strategies and their applicability in terms of interventionism (the relevant authorities intervening post facto to the corrupt acts) and managerialism (a prevention mechanism for corruptive practices through robust systems, procedures and protocols). What was particularly interesting in this section was the exchange of opinions about how to appropriately measure the two approaches and how to define aspects such as good governance. The workshop participants agreed that it is fairly unproblematic to discern and analyze the existence of sustainable political will and actual capabilities to respond to corruption practices.

The interdisciplinary approach towards researching anti-corruption frameworks examined the norms and values of the public officials and servants, the level of control and supervision, and the interrelation between the different branches of government, administration, political interests and the business sector. The emphasis of the discussion was on the linkage between the values of society which influence the public awareness of corruption practices and the relevant response by the public and the state. The research of anti-corruption initiatives indicated a close examination of national integrity frameworks incorporating sustainable will for anti-corruption, the rule of law, and an improved and properly functioning economic system according to the rules of integrity.

Particular examples from the anti-corruption efforts in the judiciary and high public official sectors performed in Bulgaria and Romania were provided and analyzed. The evaluation and research of the particular examples were a crucial part of the workshop as it became evident that the measurement mechanisms necessitate certain periods of time and monitoring of the anti-corruption practices which in both cases are performed by domestic and supranational actors such as national integrity agencies and the EU Commission. The problematic aspects in terms of evaluating the success of the anti-corruption reforms in Bulgaria and Romania were extensively discussed. For example, what is the value of the internal and external measurement of success? Does a high rate of convictions in corruption cases correspond to a conclusion that the anti-corruption efforts are effective? What happens if there is an initial surge in the anti-corruption trials and convictions and then a backlash and more reserved approach within the judiciary takes place? Examples were provided in which initially the judiciary and the magistrates would be predominantly open to anti-corruption investigations while at a later point of time the same judges would be unwilling or hesitant to hear more cases or to pass prison convictions as 'the previous convictions were enough.'

The main problem centered on the notion of the self-sustainability of anti-corruption efforts and policies. During the course of the discussion, it became apparent that measuring the sustainability of anti-corruption efforts may only be possible over time. Such anti-corruption efforts require long-term evaluation. Additionally, although court cases may provide reliable information about anti-corruption efforts, with the proviso that the judiciary is independent, transparent and honest, the dependence on conviction rates may mislead the reader. For example, statistics may include suspended convictions and under-charging in indictments and convictions for serious corruption crimes. In the long

term, it is necessary to see what happens to the convicted public officials and whether rehabilitation is successfully achieved and reflected in their subsequent official behavior, i.e. if they return to their corrupt practices after serving the conviction. This is a particular research gap that allows for analysis as it would necessitate the introduction and application of a long-term project which includes various political, administrative, sociological and legal variables.

Anti-Corruption research example: Anti-corruption agency index

In the final part of the workshop an example of an ongoing anti-corruption research project was introduced. The broader focus of the project is to analyze the effect of anti-corruption reforms in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. More specifically, it is asked whether specialized anti-corruption institutions, such as anti-corruption agencies or commissions, have a positive effect on the legitimacy of other state institutions. To facilitate this analysis, an index which reflects the performance of anti-corruption agencies was constructed. The index combines indicators measuring the institutional capacities of anti-corruption agencies (also called input indicators), such as their political independence or the financial and human resources, and the mandate of the anti-corruption agencies in terms of different functions like prevention, coordination or investigation (output indicators). In the light of general questions of anti-corruption research, the anti-corruption agency index was then critically discussed, including its conceptual difficulties regarding anti-corruption policies such as differing underlying norms, difficulties of measurement and validity or the potential for policy recommendations.

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The role of social and legal norms in fighting corruption

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Introduction

This workshop addressed inter-relations in societies between formal and legal norms, on the one hand, and informal and social norms on the other hand. The two forms are often consistent and complementary, but occasionally they contradict each other, in which case the tension becomes significant.

Both social and legal norms are directly relevant as to causes of corruption, and both are thus important for legal compliance and enforcement. They are a strong motivation for human behaviour in daily life. Considering this background, the workshop aimed at addressing the role of social and legal norms in fighting corruption, and in anti-corruption law enforcement. More specifically, the workshop set out to examine the following three questions:

1. Given the two types of norms as noted above - the formal, institutional 'legal' norms, and the informal, non-institutional 'social' norms - what are the strengths and limitations of each type in fighting corruption? More specifically, what type of social norm can promote the rule of law, or, alternatively, be an obstacle and hindrance to implementing a legal norm?
2. What has been missing amongst current anti-corruption legal norms?
How can we improve and supplement these areas?
3. What are success stories or failures, e.g. country examples, corruption cases, institutional arrangements, policies etc.?

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The state of research in this area

What we call 'informal practice' can sociologically be considered in two ways. The first sees informal practice as inherent in national culture, shaped by historical contexts. Culture represents 'values', leading not only to certain behaviour but also shaping cultural perceptions. (Adler, 1977, Hofstede and Bond, 1988, Kwok, 2006) The second sociological approach understands informal practice as derived from popular resistance against other social norms, which are imposed by new rulers or socio-economic and political changes. (Hofstede, 2001, Kwok, 2006)

Although legal and social norms have long been the subject of extensive research, they recently received closer attention. These concepts have been found particularly useful for the understanding of legal reforms and transformations during the post-Communist East European democratisation process beginning in the early 1990s. This research has also re-evaluated the political and economic dominance of communism in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. (Gelman 2001, Ledeneva 2001, Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005, Grødeland, 2006, Dobovšek and B., 2008)

Furthermore, social and legal norms have been applied to analyse acts of corruption from an aetiological point of view after the enactment of international and regional anti-corruption legislation in the early 2000s, bringing more attention to the issue of corruption, and how to combat and prevent it. The current interdisciplinary emphasis on this socio-legal area of study cuts across sociology, political science, criminology, and law, broadening the perspective for all disciplines.

Topics most discussed during the workshop

Participants in the workshop were from various disciplinary backgrounds, including political science, sociology, and psychology as well as different cultural backgrounds. This encouraged the exchange of experiences, stories and perceptions of successes and failures in the battle against corruption, resulting in learning from each other's individual experiences and knowledge. For instance, participants from countries in both Asia and Africa, mentioned low wages of customs officers as a driver of corruption, especially given that the officer's salary can be insufficient to meet basic needs, such as adequate education and medical care for children. In other words, it is seen as not only acceptable but even socially required, to develop available informal income sources which help provide for basic family needs.

Overall, unfortunately, we did not have adequate time to discuss in-depth the specific legal issues on what has been missing amongst current anti-corruption legal norms (agenda question two). Therefore, we focused on issues like strengths and limitations of social/legal norms; which types of social norms may promote the rule of law as well as success stories or failures in particular countries. The main aspects of the discussion will be outlined below.

We began by defining the notions of social norms and legal order, as many participants were interested in finding out how these two differ and interact.

According to Licht, a 'social norm', in general, is the collection of various acts which determine how people are expected to behave, not only based on law, but also more broadly on values and ethics, and including influence of religions, customs and traditions. (Licht, 2003) A legal norm, on the other hand, is only one type of social norms, a much narrower concept, considered to make up the system or rules which are applicable and effective (Razm 1980) and expected behaviors' to citizens (Shavell, 2002) by states and authorities.

As said above, these two types of norms are at times consistent and complementary, but occasionally contradict each other. Historically, legal norms are known in every society. During the workshop, cultural roots and backgrounds of these norms were discussed, including those of the current common international legal framework and modern public international law (Orakhelashvili A, 2006), and also of de-colonisation processes that had an important influence on social and legal norms in certain regions, e.g., south Asia and Africa.

Regarding the third question, case studies of corruption were discussed, including patterns and suggested causes of corruption for practices such as bribery, professional misconduct, and embezzlement. For example, although bribery in the public sector is, in formal terms, illegal everywhere, in some local contexts, forms of bribery are perceived as scandalous, whereas in other contexts they are indulged as either routine practice, or a low enforcement priority. There seemed to be a clear impact of local social structures upon the degree to which corrupt practices were tolerated or not prosecuted. This led to questions as to whether policy differences, such as institutional enactments and resources devoted to combating corruption, could be significant as ameliorating factors, or whether cultural factors were so powerful that it was difficult to fight corruption using any institutional or policy tools.

Possible research gaps

As noted above, the topic of legal and social norms is not new, but it has become the subject of renewed attention. There is both a great opportunity and need, especially for case studies, which concretise the causes and environments that lead to either law-breaking or the violation of moral standards categorised as corruption.

Researchers focusing on institutional systems and frameworks, can benefit from this broader perspective of observing social norms as well as legal and institutional arrangements, especially in a comparative setting because the forms and causes of corruption are very diverse and differ depending on regions and countries. Similarly, societies and social groups in each region and country are also diverse, where social norms are obviously a key aspect in understanding/identifying the root causes of corrupt practices. The more thoroughly we identify and observe those social norms with a significant impact on corruption, the more effective and useful our research will be.

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Why did the Panama Papers (not) shatter the world? The relationship between Journalism and Corruption

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Introduction

The Panama Papers by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) marks the biggest fraud-related data leak in the history of journalism (Obermayer, Obermaier, Wormer & Jaschensky, 2016). The economic costs of the revealed tax evasion affect the poor disproportionately: it is estimated that tax havens cost poor countries at least \$170 billion in lost tax revenues each year (Oxfam International, 2016). Among the persons exposed were famous athletes but also political leaders and public officials from various countries. Some politicians have faced considerable criticism, such as the former Prime Minister of Iceland Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, who was forced to resign amid public protests following the Panama Paper revelations. And even though the ICIJ strategically withheld parts of the data to publish them periodically, public interest has faded relatively fast (see Figure 1). Many accuse the media for the lack of public outcry. Indeed, in order to grasp the sheer size of the revealed data, but also to understand the meaning of the information, news media play a crucial role. But is the media to blame that the Panama Papers did not shake the world?

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


Figure 1 Google Trends chart illustrating the number of search enquiries for “Panama Papers” within the year 2016

In order to enable an informed discussion about the media’s role in the public response to the leak, we first provide a short introduction to the Panama Papers. After that, we briefly review the existing theories on the role of media in society in general and for anti-corruption in particular. Finally, we outline how scientific research, journalism, and other anti-corruption efforts can make use of the Panama Papers in their efforts to understand and fight corruption. One goal of this contribution is to put the Panama Papers on the map of corruption research and illustrate its potential for interdisciplinary collaboration.

What are the Panama Papers?

The way the Panama Papers came into being reads like the script of a spy movie. It all started in 2014 when an anonymous source reached out to the German Newspaper “Süddeutsche Zeitung” (Obermaier et al., 2016). What this source offered was classified and encrypted documents from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. Since the amount of data was too large for one newspaper outlet to process, the Süddeutsche Zeitung opted to analyze the data in cooperation with a cross-national investigative journalism project, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). This work on the Panama Papers spanned over 80 countries, involved more than 100 media organizations and 400 journalists. The documents indicate that Mossack Fonseca has been selling more than 200,000 anonymous offshore companies around the world.

Owning an offshore account is not illegal per-se and as Stephenson (2016) points out “firms like Mossack Fonseca might also often provide services that are (appropriately) legal”. Yet off-shore accounts are an integral component when engaging in illegal financial operations

such as tax evasion, money laundering and kleptocracy. Ostensibly offshore accounts or shell companies appear as legitimate businesses. They have founding documents, a CEO and documented employees. However, their managers – often made up of lawyers and accountants – only perform duties in order to keep up the appearance of a legitimate company. These shell companies pose an immense challenge for international financial oversight authorities because the real owner of the company’s assets often remains unknown. Such practices can only flourish in an environment where a strict banking secrecy framework is paired with very lax, to non-existent, national oversight laws on financial transactions. Such conditions predominantly exist in small island countries such as Panama or the Cayman Islands, hence the name tax havens (Hines Jr & Rice, 1990).

Although such offshore dealings have been long suspected to exist, the Panama Papers provide extensive hard data on the subject and illustrate a wide dissemination of the practice. They provide “a window into the shadowy and often sordid practices that the very wealthy - including corrupt public officials and their cronies - use to hide their assets” (Stephenson, 2016). The most publicly debated example of corruption linked to the Panama Papers was Iceland’s Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson walking out of a television interview when asked about his offshore accounts. More recent revelations indicate that the populations of many African countries have suffered severely under tax evasion and corruption enabled through offshore accounts at Mossack Fonseca as “entrepreneurs and corrupt officials across Africa have used shell companies to hide profits from the sale of natural resources and the bribes paid to gain access to them” (Shane, 2016). Given the immense societal costs, such as missing tax revenues, that have been exposed through the Panama Papers, how come there has not been more consistent public outcry about it? In order to answer this question, we first have to take a look at the role of the media in society in general and as an anti-corruption force in particular.

A brief primer on journalism and anti-corruption

In democratic societies, media are part of checks and balances and fulfill normative political functions (e.g. information, socialization, articulation, control). Often referred to as a ‘fourth estate,’ the media monitor compliance with democratic laws, values and rules (Starke, Naab, & Scherer, 2016). However, in contrast to the legislative, executive, and judiciary, mass media have no formal means to sanction misconduct by corrupt public officials; therefore, they exert their public control indirectly. Stapenhurst (2000, p. 3) distinguishes between tangible and intangible “ways in which journalism serves as an impediment to corruption”.

Tangible effects describe the media's normative role as a watchdog to hold political decision makers accountable for their actions (Norris, 2004). One way to do so is to expose wrongdoings by public officials such as tax evasion and corruption. This way, mass media can support "the prosecutorial institutions by investigating and reporting incidences of corruption" (Camaj, 2012, p. 2-3). In the ideal case media spur investigations by official bodies and convictions of corrupt political actors (Stapenhurst, 2000).

Mass media also provide a civic forum for voicing complaints and thus contribute to forming public opinion. By "highlighting policy failures, maladministration by public officials, corruption in the judiciary and scandals in the corporate sector" (Norris, 2004, p. 119) the media can generate public pressure to force corrupt politicians to resign and to lose political power. A demonstrative example of this type of influence by the media is the aforementioned resignation of the former Icelandic Prime Minister. A loss of reputation of corrupt politicians as a result of media coverage can also be considered to be a means of indirect control since reputation is a major power resource for politicians. Such media effects require investigative media to go beyond just being passive observers and, instead, actively engage in uncovering misconduct (Starke et al., 2016).

A controlling press can also have a preventive effect (Stapenhurst, 2000). Deterrence theory (Becker, 1974) is a standard external cost-benefit perspective that generates three hypotheses as to the forces that are expected to increase the frequency and magnitude of corruption: (1) high magnitude of external rewards, (2) low probability of detection, (3) low severity of punishment. If the media fulfil their watchdog role, there is an increased likelihood for incumbents that their misconduct is exposed and consequently for them to suffer criminal prosecution, a loss of reputation or power. Thus, the personal benefit of corruption decreases, and potential perpetrators are deterred from engaging in corruption in the first place. However, in order to successfully deter corruption among public officials, exposure via media, strict anti-corruption laws, and effective prosecution via strong institutions of justice need to complement one another. If official sanctioning institutions are weak or even corrupt themselves, potential perpetrators do not have to fear punishment (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). Related to the Panama Papers, in order for the revelations and the ensuing media coverage to produce tangible effects, the governing institutions need to possess sufficient means to prosecute powerful offenders, be it of tax evasion, corruption or other forms of criminal activity.

Besides such tangible effects, media can also have intangible anti-corruption effects. They can be described as "those checks on corruption which arise from the broader social climate of enhanced political pluralism, enlivened public debate and a heightened sense of accountability among politicians, public bodies and institutions that are inevitably the by-product of

a hard-hitting, independent news media” (Stapenhurst, 2000, pp. 2–3). Empirical support stems from studies that show that information supply has a positive impact on government responsiveness (Besley & Burgess, 2002) and accountability (Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013) and that public access to information is a powerful deterrent of local capture (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004). Moreover, journalists can raise awareness of problems associated with corruption and shape social norms about prevalence and moral evaluation of corrupt behavior within societies. Empirical evidence highlights the importance of a general anti-corruption culture (Fisman & Miguel, 2008), corruption awareness (Goel, Nelson, & Naretta, 2012), and perceived social norms (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, & van Lange, 2015; Starke, Köbis & Brandt, 2016) as important means to fighting corruption.

Why did the Panama Papers (not) shake the world?

These different ways in which investigative journalism might curb corruption are of course very normative and paint a very optimistic picture and some of these mechanisms also apply to the Panama Papers. In this case, the role of the watchdog was performed by the ICIJ, “a global network of more than 190 investigative journalists in more than 65 countries who collaborate on in-depth investigative stories” (International Consortium of Investigative Journalism, 2016). The data leak and the resulting exposure of widespread misuse of shell companies on a global scale triggered not only public protests (e.g. demonstrations against the PM of Iceland), or parliamentary questioning (e.g. of the PM of the United Kingdom) but also policy changes. In the aftermath of the Panama Papers, the German secretary of finance Wolfgang Schäuble proposed new tax laws in order to cut down on the use of offshore account for tax evasion. These cases exemplify the potential of watchdog journalism to induce changes in the political system. Whether or not the Panama Papers have any preventive effects by deterring potential perpetrators from engaging in offshore accounts in the first place is still debatable at this point, but the enforcement of stricter tax laws most probably will. However, the concrete implications witnessed in Iceland, the UK and Germany provide some best practice examples. Of course, in majority of cases, the culprits implicated in the Panama Papers were not legally prosecuted or even investigated and in most countries policies remained unchanged. Such cases elucidate the oftentimes limited power of the media as an indirect control mechanism. Changes in policies can only occur if policy makers attend to that matter as a result of media coverage. In this regard, an active civil society plays a crucial role by applying pressure to political decision makers to introduce new or improved policies. Since the onset of social media platforms, it has become easier for citizens to contact public officials directly, to make

their voices and opinions heard and to partake in political debates (Sundar, 2004). In terms of political content, Social Networking Sites (SNS) such as Facebook or Twitter are predominantly used to receive information about politics, to engage in political discussion with other peers or to observe conversations between politicians and other users (“background listening”, Crawford, 2009, p. 528). However, active participation in political issues and direct interactions with politicians are on the rise (Ancu & Cozma, 2009; Emmer, Wolling, & Vowe, 2012; Gustafsson, 2012). Taken together, the media can play a crucial role in the fight against tax evasion, corruption and other forms of criminal activities by public officials. However, the effectiveness hinges on the respective level of corruption in which the media platform operates and consequently the effectiveness of formal prosecution institutions. It is often assumed that media furthermore influences whether and how the public reacts to such scandals, yet extensive empirical data on this issue is lacking. In the next paragraphs we thus outline a current research design that tackles that question.

How the Panama Papers can be used as a source for corruption research

Besides being a source for research on illicit cash-flows, tax evasion and corruption, the Panama Papers have also inspired a research project on the role of media framing on readers’ inclination to act against corruption. We outline this particular research project, which emerged from the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research (ICR) Forum. An interdisciplinary team of researchers investigates potential media effects on the perception of responsibility and collective action in response to different forms of corruption (Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti & Van Lange, 2016). We draw on the framing theory (see for more details on framing theory, Iyengar, 1991) that distinguishes between thematic and episodic news frames. While episodic news frames rather focus on single events, instances, and certain individual actors, thematic news frames provide more background information and cover an issue in a more analytical way (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008; Starke & Flemming, 2015). Thus, both types of news frames tend to attribute both causal (Who is responsible for causing the problem?) and treatment responsibility (Who is responsible for solving the problem?) differently. Iyengar (1991, pp. 15–16) concludes that “episodic framing tends to elicit individualistic rather than societal attributions of responsibility, while thematic framing has the opposite effect”. Building on this theoretic approach, we investigate the influence of media framing on responses to public scandals such as corruption and tax evasion. More specifically, we experimentally test to what extent episodic and thematic framing impacts moral emotions and perceived responsibility with regard to political scandals.

For that purpose, we generated and pre-tested a total of four newspaper articles: Two articles depict a case of tax evasion through a Panamanian Law Firm ('Panama Paper article') and two describe an instance of revolving door, a form of public corruption ('Revolving door article'). For both the Panama Paper article and the corruption article, we then manipulate whether an individual is portrayed as the primary culprit (episodic frame) or whether the incident is primarily described as the result of loopholes in the system (thematic frame). Using a between-subject design, we then assess the responses to these different articles. To be more precise, we measure a) emotional reactions, both using a classic scale and a novel more intuitive measure of emotions, b) perceived responsibility c) reported willingness to engage in collective action and d) actual inclination to support anti-corruption. We hypothesized the following:

1. Episodic news frames induce people to feel stronger moral emotions compared to thematic news frames.
2. Episodic news frames induce people to perceive lower public responsibility on corruption eradication compared to thematic news frames.
3. Thematic news frames induce people to engage in collective action more strongly compared to episodic news frames.

With this research project, we hope to obtain crucial new insights into the way in which media portrayals of public scandals contribute to emotional responses and collective action.

Summary

The Panama Papers mark an unprecedented data leak. The last time such large-scale corruption was caught red handed was the Nixon era Watergate Scandal where the media actively exposed the internal corruption of the administration and eventually that exposure led to not only to the introduction of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 but it also became a starting point for USA to lobby for legislation similar to the FCPA in Europe and the rest of the world. Whether the Panama Papers will trigger comparable efforts to fight corruption remains questionable. To enable a better understanding of what the Panama Papers actually are and how they can be used as a subject and source for corruption research we make a threefold contribution. First, we provide a short overview about the emergence, size and consequences of the Panama Papers. Specifically, we zero in on the role of the media. We illustrate how the media contributes to anti-corruption in general and its role in shaping the response to the Panama Papers in particular. This way, we discuss factors that shaped the media's reaction

to the Panama Papers. Second, we illuminate how scientific research, journalism, and other anti-corruption efforts can make use of the Panama Papers in their efforts to understand and fight corruption. Third and finally, we conclude by outlining an interdisciplinary research project that brings together scholars from three different disciplines (social psychology, political science, communication science). The study is based on the Panama Papers and investigates the effect of news media framing on public perceptions of responsibility for corruption.

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